19591

BOOK REVIEWS

Committee that "on balance" this authority is "a necessary instrument to advance the national interest" is beginning to be questioned. It is hoped that this
doubt will gain support.
The authors of "Freedom To Travel" obviously did not intend it as a definitive statement of American policy on passport control. What they hoped to do
was stimulate an informed and rational discussion of this important public
issue. Their admirable report will undoubtedly achieve that purpose.
WILL MASLoW*
Member of the New York and Supreme Court Bars; General Counsel, American Jewish
Congress.
*

Law and Locomotives: The Impact of the Railroad on Wisconsin Law in the

Nineteenth Century. By Robert S. Hunt. Madison, Wisconsin: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1958. Pp. xii, 292. $6.50.
In 1874 Benjamin R. Curtis, of the Massachusetts Bar, stood at the apex of
his profession in terms of reputation for legal acumen and individual integrity.
Many lawyers and laymen throughout the nation devoutly hoped that President Grant would choose Curtis to succeed Chase as Chief Justice of the United
States. That the President did not do so, even after suffering the humiliation of
two false starts, was widely regarded as a reflection upon the President and not
upon a man who had earlier served with distinction as a member of the Supreme
Court and whose solid professional and personal distinctions acquired in that
service bore the liberal patina of dissent from the reactionary dogmas of Dred
Scott v. Sandford.'
1874 was also the year in which a frontier legislature in Wisconsin passed, in
what it conceived to be the public interest, a statute limiting transportation
charges exacted from its citizens by the railroads operating in the state. The
statute in question-the so-called Potter Law-was a rudimentary beginning
at best on the complex job of economic regulation. In addition to prescribing
maximum rates for various classifications of passenger and freight service, it
created an administrative body of three commissioners with powers to inquire
into operating costs and to reduce, but not to raise, the prescribed rates in
certain narrowly defined instances. The sanctions provided by the law were
wholly inadequate inasmuch as no authority was given the state to proceed
directly against the railroads for violation of the statutory rates.
Mild as this was, at least by reference to the standards of regulation lying
just over the horizon, the two major railroads in Wisconsin promptly announced that they would not obey the law when it became effective, and set
in motion legal maneuvers looking towards the invalidation of the law in the
courts. These included, as a first step, obtaining opinions from prominent law'60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

yers that the law was a nullity. One such opinion was supplied by Curtis.2 He
stated that "it is not within the field of legislation, under any American Constitution, to fix and prescribe for the future, what prices shall be demanded
either for commodities or for personal service, or for a union of both." This
principle he derived not from any specific or otherwise identifiable constitutional
limitation, but rather from some general spirit immanent in the country's institutions as a whole and those of Wisconsin in particular. 3
In the ensuing litigation as to the validity of the statute under Wisconsin
law, it required the exertion of the fullest range of the powers and personality
of an extraordinary state court judge--Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court-to lay this doctrine to rest; and the railroads, in
the best tradition of deference to the rule of law, dutifully bowed to his will
and complied with the law during the short life remaining to it before its repeal
in 1876. The point for present purposes, however, is that if a lawyer who combined the professional sophistication and demonstrated breadth of Curtis could
fail so signally to find within the framework of law the powers requisite to cope
with a pressing public need, it is hardly surprising that the pioneer community
of Wisconsin was slow and fumbling in its legal responses to the phenomenon
of the railroad corporation.
This is the theme of Mr. Hunt's absorbing account of the interaction of law
and locomotive upon each other in the Wisconsin of the last century. Chief Justice Ryan was the exception. In his opinion in the Potter Law litigation4 there
is found what was less noticeable in other Wisconsin legal institutions-an
explicit recognition of the non-private aspects of the railroad in relation to a
society straining to build its economic foundations, and a confident acceptance
of the premise that these aspects are within reach of the resources of law.
It is Mr. Hunt's conclusion that "the legislature in general failed to establish
its basic position of supremacy" (p. 168) and that, in the main, this arm of the
2 Two others were furnished, respectively by Rockwood Hoar, also of the Boston Bar, and
William M. Evarts, of New York. Curiously enough, these two were coupled with Curtis in
the hopes that Grant might see fit to make an outstanding appointment. After the President's
first two nominees evoked such a lack of enthusiasm that they were never confirmed by the
Senate, the mantle fell upon the relatively unknown Morrison R. Waite, of Ohio. It was Waite
who wrote the opinion first sustaining the efforts of a state legislature to regulate the rates of
a private business, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). On the same day the Waite court
upheld, in the so-called Granger Cases, several of the state statutes regulating railroads, including the Potter Law. See Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
3Although Curtis did find additional support for his conclusion in the state constitution's
ban on taking property for a public use without just compensation, and in the Contracts
Clause of the Federal Constitution (because of the alleged diminution of revenues available
to satisfy creditors), he did not refer to "due process of law" or to the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a prophet of the course of judicial control over rate-making as it was to develop under the
last-mentioned provision, he failed notably when, in the course of his argument, he posed this
alternative: ". . . this power to prescribe prices of commodities and service for the future, does
not exist at all, or it is unlimited." See Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court
199 n. 36 (1939).
4Attorney General v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874).
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government persisted in turning over to the railroads substantial portions of the
public authority without any comprehension of the significance of what it was
doing. It delegated powers of eminent domain; it passed along large tracts of
public lands which the railroad promoters had prevailed upon Congress to give
to the state; it granted the powers and privileges of corporate existence and
combination; and it authorized local governments to participate in the financing of the new enterprises.
This is not to say that these actions were necessarily bad, or that they did not
effectively advance the obvious and urgent public interest in providing transportation facilities so critically required in an undeveloped area. Indeed, an
entrepreneur contemplating prospectively the problems involved in building a
railroad in the Wisconsin of the 1850's, could not be assured of success even
with this kind of help. But, as Mr. Hunt implies, the same kind and degree of
assistance could have been extended under conditions of continuing control
and supervision which would have tempered some of the excesses and prevented
some of the injury to the innocents which subsequently occurred.6
Many of these injuries were due not so much to the selfish scheming of the
early promoters as to an enveloping fuzziness in the minds of the people at
large with respect to the public character of a railroad-building venture in the
mid-Nineteenth Century; and sometimes the intervention of the law for a
benevolent purpose only contributed to the confusion. For example, the citizens of the fledgling state believed they had taken a far-sighted step towards
preventing abuse when they embedded in their constitution a fiat prohibition
upon state borrowing for internal improvements. But the effect of this prohibition was to cause the search for capital to center upon stock subscriptions by
municipalities and individuals along the proposed routes, more often than not
with disastrous consequences which might well have been avoided if the state
had been free to provide direct financial aid for a facility of state-wide concern.
The fascinating, albeit painful, description in this book of the devices employed
to obtain stock subscriptions from farmers, secured by mortgages of their lands
and with the cash coming from the sale of this paper in the Eastern money
markets, is a classic case of distributing among the few the cost of an improvement which should have been shared by the many. Thus the embodiment in
the law of a principle which was unexceptionable on its face but woefully out of
harmony with the realities of the situation represented a legal response which
proved worse than no response at all.
The legislature's general record of inadequacy is, in this survey, paralleled
by the ineptitude of the executive. With rare and highly sporadic exceptions,
the governors of Wisconsin throughout this period furnished no effective leadership in devising solutions for problems which touched closely upon the interests
5 A striking feature of Mr. Hunt's story is the rigidly stern enforcement by the courts,
under circumstances which frequently cried aloud for the ameliorative intervention of equitable considerations, of the notes, bonds, and mortgages given by the local governments and
individual farmers to aid railroad construction.
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of all citizens. It is not too clear why this was so. Since this period was merely
the lull before the impending storm of the intense and thorough regulation
which took place under the spur of Governor LaFollette in the early years of
the next century, it is interesting to speculate on the perennial question of
whether it is the accident of personality, or the inertia of the times, that is
decisive for the shaping of events.
Lawyers who read this book will be gratified by the author's conclusion that
it was the courts which exhibited the greatest statesmanship and enjoyed the
most success in bringing the influences of law to bear on a social problem of
major magnitude. Judges like Ryan and practitioners like Matthew Carpenter
functioned with considerable effectiveness in the vacuum of legislative and executive inaction or inadequacy. Judges, working from common law formulations
in the main, did the most to integrate the railroad into the existing structure
with a minimum of economic dislocation and unfairness to personal rights and
interests. The parallel this presents with events of more recent vintage will not
be lost upon those with a sense of the recurrent rhythms of history. It confirms
a deepening conviction, among a growing number of thoughtful people, of the
necessity for wise and steadfastly independent judges, and of the significance
of the mechanism of the private lawsuit as an instrument for the accommodation of change.
Viewed against the elaborate framework of present-day regulation, the story
told by this book challenges the attention principally because of the slowness of
the law's reactions. Mr. Hunt's chosen period, for example, ends without even
the most primitive utilization of the administrative processes which characterize railroad regulation today. This dilatoriness is the more striking when it is
remembered that during this period the railroads enjoyed an almost complete
monopoly status and, in consequence, could press their monopoly advantage
in harmful ways beyond the reach of courts deciding cases in the common law
tradition. The regulation came eventually, of course, but only after the barn
door had been swinging wide on its hinges for a long time and many people had
been badly trampled by the iron horse rampaging at will.
Mr. Hunt's counterpart of the future, writing of the latter part of the Twentieth Century, may find it necessary to deal somewhat more with the problems
presented by the impact of the law on the railroad instead of the other way
round, as in this book. For once regulation came, it stayed. Desperately and
indefensibly late in arriving, it seems grimly determined not to expose itself to
the charge of leaving too soon, despite the fact that any remnant of the monopoly power for which this regulation was tardily contrived is about as hard to find
today as a steam locomotive.
Where regulation is slow in coming when needed in fact, great damage can,
of course, be done to the social and economic fabric, as Mr. Hunt's researches
reveal. May it not, however, be plausibly supposed that the persistence of close
regulation beyond its appointed time produces its own ills? And does this not
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suggest that, even as the legal responses of an organized society to a new problem carry costs in consequence of delay, those responses entail other-and
equally detrimental-costs if they continue unabated after the problem itself
has disappeared? Mr. Hunt's telescope may come to the hand of his successor
with the other end offering the more accurate angle of vision.
What is certain is that this kind of historical study of the law's operation
will always have a valued place. Apart from its intrinsic worth a§ a factual
re-creation of the events of a particular time and place, it is instructive for later
generations of law-makers wrestling with the eternal problem of making the
law responsive to changing events. Mr. Hunt's book does both in ample
measure, and serves as additional confirmation of the wisdom of those at the
University of Wisconsin, notably Willard Hurst, who thought some years ago
that there were rich veins to be quarried in American legal history, and that
the prospecting could as profitably be done in their own back yard as in some
more remote region.
CARL McGOWAN*
* Member of the Chicago Bar.

Close Corporations. By F. Hodge O'Nea]. Chicago: Callaghan and Company,
1958. 2 Vols. Vol. 1: Pp. xx, 369; Vol. 2: Pp. vii, 437. $30.00.
The field of corporate law is the subject of many volumes, but these two
erudite volumes are the first to be devoted to the subject of the "Close Corporation," and it is the close corporation, after all, which is the concern of most lawyers who have corporate clients. Professor F. Hodge O'Neal has carefully culled
from the vast body of corporate law those portions pertaining to the close corporation. He has assembled them in logical order, and with a clear analysis and
an excellent set of specimen forms has presented them to us for ready reference.
Control devices and flexible arrangements are often of fundamental importance in the close corporation. Heretofore, the lawyer wishing to counsel his
clients in this area found it necessary to resort to a variety of sources, as well
as to his imagination. Now, by reference to this work, even the lawyer with
relatively little experience can counsel his corporate clients regarding a multitude of choices in flexible arrangements. The experienced corporate lawyer will
also find a great deal of assistance in Professor O'Neal's having tied together
lucidly and expertly varied close corporation problems, including those with
tax consequences, and presenting suggested solutions, some of which might previously have been thought about only vaguely, if at all.
The term "close corporation" is used in this book to mean a corporation
whose shares are not generally traded in the securities markets. Professor
O'Neal points out that while this term usually designates a small enterprise,
many close corporations have tremendous assets and operate all over the world.
Most of the problems discussed in his book are pertinent to all close corporations, irrespective of size.

